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CRYPTANALYSIS OF BLOCK CIPHERS
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ABSTRACT. Distinguishing distributions is a major part during cryptanalysis
of symmetric block ciphers. The goal of the cryptanalyst is to distinguish two
distributions; one that characterizes the number of certain events which occur
totally at random and another one that characterizes same type of events but
due to propagation inside the cipher. This can be realized as a hypothesis testing
problem, where a source is used to generate independent random samples in some
given ﬁnite set with some distribution P, which is either R or W, corresponding
to propagation inside the cipher or a random permutation respectively. Distin-
guisher’s goal is to determine which one is most likely the one which was used to
generate the sample. In this paper, we study a general hypothesis-testing based
approach to construct statistical distinguishers using truncated diﬀerential prop-
erties. The observable variable in our case is the expected number of pairs that
follow a certain truncated diﬀerential property of the form ΔX → ΔY after a
certain number of rounds. As a proof of concept, we apply this methodology to
GOST and SIMON64/128 block ciphers and present distinguishers on 20 and 22
rounds respectively.
1. Introduction
In cryptanalysis, we very often study the problem of distinguishing distri-
butions, one distribution that describes the number of events occurring due to
a random permutation and another one describing the same variable but due
to propagation inside the cipher. The aim of crypto designers is to construct
cryptographic primitives that resemble the properties of a random permutation
to the highest achievable degree. On the other hand, the cryptanalyst’s aim is
to design an algorithm (or a distinguisher) that would allow him to distinguish
a given a cipher from a random permutation by capturing as much as possible
c© 2015 Mathematical Institute, Slovak Academy of Sciences.
2010 Mathemat i c s Sub j e c t C l a s s i f i c a t i on: 94A60, 68P25.
Keywords: diﬀerential cryptanalysis, hypothesis, testing, distinguisher, SIMON, GOST,
truncated diﬀerentials,
217
THEODOSIS MOUROUZIS—NICOLAS COURTOIS
of the cipher’s structure. Such a distinguishing attack might reveal information
which can be used to reduce the space of the key candidates. This might lead to
an attack faster than exhaustive search either against a large number of rounds
or even against the whole block cipher. Some good examples of of this are dif-
ferential attacks on GOST described in [9], [10], [14].
We should also note that the behaviour which we expect for a random per-
mutation, is also expected to work for almost any permutation, also from some
very speciﬁc distribution dues for example to incorrect guesses in a key recovery
attack. In other words cases in which the assumptions made by the attacker are
not true, are assumed to behave as a random permutation, even though we know
that they are not a random permutation.
Distinguishing attacks can be summarized as follows. Suppose that a source is
used to generate independent random samples with some distribution P, which
is either R or W . A distinguisher is an algorithm used to determine which one is
the most likely the one which was used to generate the sample. Hence, the over-
all attack based on distinguishers considers the following underlying statistical
hypothesis testing problem,
Null hypothesis: H0 : P = W,
Alternative hypothesis: H1 : P = R.
This can be seen as a hypothesis-testing problem of distinguishing the two dis-
tributions as shown in Figure 1, page 219.
Assuming that we have two random normally distributed variables W and
R with parameters (E(W ), V (W )) and (E(R), V (R)), respectively. Our aim is
given an observation of the variable of our interest to determine from which
distribution this sample is more likely to be taken.
Note that for cryptanalytic purposes, we assume that distribution W corre-
sponds to a wrong assumption or a wrong key, i.e., to a random permutation,
while R corresponds to a right assumption or the right key. To be precise, the
attacker can make any assumption on they key and the data inside the cipher,
not only an assumption on the key, see the ﬁrst stages of the complex attack
described in [9, 10] for a speciﬁc example. For simplicity throughout this paper
we will just speak about assumptions about the key, a simpler case which is also
a lot more common in cryptanalysis. The distribution R is the most interesting
one to study and it has a lot of interesting properties which the attacker can
deduce from his assumptions. This is related to the notion of “propagation”
of diﬀerentials inside the cipher1.
1A random permutation can also have input and output properties assumed by the attacker,
however this will be accidental. For a permutation which satisﬁes all the assumptions of the
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Figure 1. The two Gaussian distributions corresponding to wrong key
guess (red) and right key guess (green). The red-shaded region corresponds
to the probability of false positives or Type I error value.
The probability density function of the distribution of the variable W is
given by
fW(x) =
1√
2πV (W )
exp−
1
2V (W )
(x−E(W ))2 . (1)
Assume that based on our experiments we have observed x events of our
interest. From Figure 1 we observe that if x > E(R), we can assume with
probability 12 that this observation corresponds to the right key.
On the other hand, the probability of accepting the wrong key as correct (false
positive or Type I error) is represented by the red-shaded region in Figure 1.
Type I error is computed by the following formulae,
P (W > R) =
∞∫
E(R)
fW(x) dx =
1
2
(
1− erf
(
E(R)−E(W )√
2V (W )
))
, (2)
where erf(x) is the Gaussian error function given by
erf(x) =
2√
π
x∫
0
exp−t
2
dt. (3)
In terms of Type II error (right key rejection) we set it to constant prob-
ability 12 . Our scope is to study this hypothesis problem applied to diﬀeren-
tial cryptanalysis and its variants, especially using truncated diﬀerentials. The
variable of our interest is the number of plaintext pairs with diﬀerence lying
attacker on the outside, and on the inside, we expect a strong path of correlated diﬀerential
events inside the cipher which we call “propagation”, see Figure 2 on the page 221.
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in a set ΔX and their diﬀerence after r rounds lies in a particular truncated
diﬀerential set ΔY . We aim to use particular sets of diﬀerences which capture
the mathematical structure of the cipher.
In this paper, we describe a general framework for constructing such distin-
guishers. As a proof of concept we apply this methodology to construct distin-
guishers that could be used to distinguish a large number of rounds for two
well-known ciphers, GOST and SIMON. Based on this technique we construct
a 20-round and a 22-round distinguisher for GOST and SIMON, respectively.
Similar distinguishers can be found in [5], [9], [10], [14], [15].
2. Diﬀerential cryptanalysis
Diﬀerential Cryptanalysis (DC) is a general form of probabilistic or statistical
cryptanalytic technique that belongs to the category of chosen-plaintext attacks.
It was developed and popularized by E l i B i h a m and A d i S h am i r [2] even
though the attack has been known for much longer, see [11] for a short historical
survey. It is a generic attack that could applied to any cryptographic primitive.
In DC, the main idea is to study the propagation of diﬀerences inside an iter-
ated block cipher and compare with the case of a random permutation. Thus, we
discover how and where the cipher exhibits non-random behaviour. The task is
to discover speciﬁc diﬀerences that propagate with comparatively higher prob-
ability as in the case of a random permutation. By exploiting these properties
further an attacker can recover parts of the secret key or the full key with time
complexity lower than an exhaustive search.
In such attacks, the ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd pairs of input and output diﬀerences
over suﬃciently many rounds, that propagate with relatively high probability.
Usually, we search for diﬀerences with their propagation round after round,
cf. left hand side in Figure 2, on the page 221. Otherwise, we ﬁx a number
of rounds and search for events which occur for the whole block of rounds in
a black box way, totally ignoring intermediate diﬀerences. The latter is known
as a diﬀerential, cf. right hand side in Figure 2.
2.1. Truncated Diﬀerentials
Truncated Diﬀerential Cryptanalysis is a generalization of DC developed
by L a r s K n u d s e n [4]. In traditional DC we study the propagation of sin-
gle diﬀerences, while in truncated DC we consider diﬀerences that are par-
tially determined, i.e., we are interested only in some parts of the diﬀerence.
This technique has been successfully applied to many block ciphers such as
SAFER, IDEA, Skipjack, Twoﬁsh and many others.
We deﬁne the truncation TRUNC(a) of a n-bit string a as in Deﬁnition 1.
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Figure 2. The left diagram illustrates a propagation of diﬀerences through
diﬀerent rounds, which is called a diﬀerential characteristic. On the right
side, a diﬀerential, where only input-output diﬀerences are considered and
middle diﬀerences are ignored.
  1 (Truncation, [4]) Let a = a0a1 ldotsan−1 be an n-bit string,
then its truncation is the n-bit string b given by
b0b1 . . . bn−1 = TRUNC(a0a1 . . . an−1), where either bi = ai or bi = ∗,
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and ∗ is an unknown value.
The notion of truncated diﬀerentials (cf. Deﬁnition 2) extends naturally to dif-
ferences.
  2 (Truncated Diﬀerentials, [4]) Let (α, β) be an i-round diﬀeren-
tial, then if α′ and β′ are truncations of α and β respectively, then (α′, β′) is an
i-round truncated diﬀerential.
Note that we always need to exclude the zero diﬀerence from our set of dif-
ferences which are allowed.
Example 1. The truncated diﬀerential on 8 bytes of the form 0000000000∗00000
(in hexadecimal representation), where ∗ = x1x2x3x4, is a set of diﬀerences
of size 16− 1 (excluding the zero diﬀerence).
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A truncated characteristic predicts only part of the diﬀerence in a pair of texts
after each round of encryption. A truncated diﬀerential is a collection of trun-
cated characteristics. Truncated diﬀerentials proved to be a very useful cryptan-
alytic tool against many block ciphers which at ﬁrst glance seem secure against
basic diﬀerential cryptanalysis.
In the next section we employ a simple heuristic discovery algorithm for dis-
covering truncated diﬀerential properties which propagate with suﬃciently high
probability. In a later stage we combine these properties to construct a large
round distinguisher which we use to mount a diﬀerential attack on a larger
number of rounds.
3. Applications
In this section, we describe a general framework for the construction of eﬃ-
cient distinguishers, which is based on propagations of well-chosen propagations.
This methodology is heuristic and it does not guarantee that the best possible
distinguisher is obtained.
Our construction works as follows. Suppose we obtained the sets X1,
X2, . . . , Xr which propagate with suﬃciently high probability for m rounds for
an iterated block cipher (cf. Figure 3, page 223).
Then, we compute the cumulative probability of a transition from any diﬀer-
ence in {X1, X2, . . . , Xr} to itself for the middle n−2m rounds. We select Xi, Xj
as the input and output diﬀerences, which maximize the cumulative probabil-
ity of the distinguisher. This methodology was introduced and was also studied
earlier in [5], [6], [10], [14].
The aim is to distinguish a reduced version of an n-bit block cipher from
a random permutation. In this paper we are interested in n = 64.
For a random permutation on 64 bits we compute the probability Xi → Xj ,
where Xi and Xj are sets of diﬀerences with sizes |Xi| and |Xj |, respectively,
as follows (cf. Lemma 1).
	

 1 (Random Permutation Property on 64 bits for sets) Let P :{0, 1}64→
{0, 1}64 be a uniformly random permutation. Given all pairs of inputs (Pi, Pj)
with Pi ⊕ Pj ∈ Xi, where Xi is a set of non-zero diﬀerences, then the aver-
age number of resulting pairs
(
P (Pi), P (Pj)
)
that satisfy P (Pi) ⊕ P (Pj) ∈ Xj ,
denoted by Eref , where Xj is a set of non-zero diﬀerences, is given by,
Eref =
|Xi| · |Xj |
2
. (4)
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Figure 3. General construction of a distinguisher based on individual tran-
sitional probabilities.
P r o o f. For a random permutation P we have that every single combination
of an input diﬀerential on 64 bits, and of an output diﬀerential on 64 bits,
is expected to occur about 12 times on average. This is because we have in total
2127 pairs of inputs and about 2128 possible sets of two diﬀerentials.
For a pair of input output diﬀerences Xi,Xj we have |Xi| · |Xj | possibilities
and each has expected frequency of 12 times on average. Overall, we expect
to obtain 12 · |Xi| · |Xj | pairs of inputs (Pi, Pj) with Pi ⊕ Pj ∈ Xi such that
P (Pi)⊕ P (Pj) ∈ Xj . 
Subsequently, we need to compute the number of expected pairs with this
input and output diﬀerence due to propagation inside the cipher.
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	

 2 (Cumulative Probability of Distinguisher) The expected number
of pairs (Pi, Pj) with input diﬀerence in Xi which follow the diﬀerential charac-
teristic shown in Figure 3 is approximately given by:
Eij = 2
63 · |Xi| ·
∑
m,n
(
P (Xi → Xm) · P (Xm → Xn) · P (Xn → Xj)
)
. (5)
P r o o f. The expected number of pairs (Pi, Pj) with Pi ⊕ Pj in open set Xi is
given by 264 · |Xi| · 12 . Any diﬀerence in the set Xi is mapped to any diﬀerence
in Xj over random key with probability (using Markov Property, cf. [14])
pij =
∑
m′,n′
(
P (Xi → Xm′) · P (Xm′ → Xn′) · P (Xn′ → Xj)
)
.
Then, the expected number of output pairs is given by
Eij = 2
63 · |Xi| · pij . (6)

Our aim is to distinguish the two distributions; one corresponding to a random
permutation (or naturally occurred) and one due to propagation with addition-
ally have the middle diﬀerences (propagation).
In the ﬁrst case, we expect on average Eref pairs, while in the second case
we expect Ei,j + Eref − Einter pairs, where Einter is the number of pairs which
occur naturally but also have this middle diﬀerence property. If this number is
non-negligible, then the analysis becomes more complex. However, these middle
diﬀerences can be used to make the two sets entirely disjoint and thus assume
that Einter is negligible.
Assuming that the sets are entirely disjoint, the distributions of the sample
means Eref and Ei,j + Eref can be approximated by Normal Distributions
X ∼ N (Eref , Eref) and Y ∼ N (Ei,j +Eref , Ei,j +Eref ),
respectively. In our case, since we use intermediate diﬀerence, we can assume that
the intersection of the two sets is negligible. The variance in both cases equals the
mean since we approximate the distributions of the variable of number of pairs
by Poisson distribution.
We deﬁne the advantage of the distinguisher as a measure of expressing the
number of standard deviations that the mean of distribution X deviates from
that of Y. In cryptography an ‘advantage’ is typically a diﬀerence in success
probability in two experiments in which an adversary distinguishes between an
idealized and real situation. Our particular deﬁnition is rescaled to provide a
standardized measure of success of a distinguisher for the purpose of judging the
validity of an assumption on key bits (or another type of attacker assumption).
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  3 (Advantage of Distinguisher) The advantage of a distinguisher
A for distinguishing X ∼ N (μ1, σ21) over Y ∼ N (μ2, σ22) is given by
ADV =
(μ2 − μ1)
σ1
. (7)
We know that by Central Limit Theorem (CLT) that the sample mean distri-
bution will be approximately Normal with mean equal to the variance.
Thus, the advantage is given by
Ei,j√
Eref
.
Note that, in order to compute the probability of a transition we use a very
simple algorithm that simply counts the number of events of our interest for
a given ﬁxed number of trials. We assume that the distribution of the number
of events of our interest follows (approximately) a Poisson distribution. We use
this distribution as we have experimentally observed that for all cases we have
tried.
• We have a discrete distribution of small integers.
• In all cases we have tried and are included in this paper the variance is
relatively close to the mean.
For a sample of size N if x denotes the number of events that were ob-
served (approximated by P o i s s o n with parameter Poisson mean Np, where p
is the true mean), then the approximated Standard Deviation (SD) of the vari-
able xN , where N is assumed to be constant and p the observed mean, is given
by
√
Np/N =
√
p/N. This is because the variance equals to the mean in case
of a Poisson distribution.
Let I1 be the interval [p− t
√
p′/N, p+ t
√
p/N ], where t a parameters of our
choice, expressing how accurately we would like to search. In our simulations we
would like I1 to be contained in the interval
I2 =
[
p · 2−a, p · 2a] ,
where a is an error we allow in the exponent of the mean as a power of 2.
For example a = 0.1 is a frequent choice. We assume that the true mean that
we are aiming to approximate by simulations is bigger than some probability
value p0 in order to ensure that our algorithm terminates in reasonable time.
The inclusion of sets implies that we need to run N > N0 simulations, where N0
is given by
N0 =
22at2
(2a − 1)2 .
1
p0
(8)
in order to achieve the desired precision. Since we record the mean xN we expect
by Central Limit Theorem that the distribution of our mean converges to a
Normal Distribution. Thus, for the results presented in the next section we run
simulations for at least N0 times in order to get desired precision, e.g., a = 0.1
in the exponents of probabilities which are of interest to the attacker.
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3.1. Application A: SIMON
SIMON is a lightweight block cipher designed by NSA, with the aim to have op-
timal hardware performance [13]. It follows the classical Feistel design paradigm
and operates on two n-bit halves in each round.
The basic version SIMON64/128 has 44 rounds. Each round of SIMON
applies a non-linear, non-bijective function
F : GF (2)n → GF (2)n to the left half of the state.
The operations used are as follows:
(1) bitwise XOR,
(2) bitwise AND, and
(3) left circular shift, Sj by j bits.
We denote the input to the ith round by Li−1||Ri−1 and in each round the left
word Li−1 is used as input to the round function F deﬁned by
F (Li−1) = (Li−1 <<< 1) · (Li−1 <<< 8)⊕ (Li−1 <<< 2), (9)
where ‘ · ’ is the bitwise AND operator.
The next state Li||Ri is computed in the following way
Li = Ri−1 ⊕ F (Li−1)⊕Ki−1, (10)
Ri = Li−1. (11)
The output of the last round is the ciphertext after applying the round func-
tion for 44 times for the particular variant SIMON64/128. More details are out
of scope of this paper and can be found in [13].
3.2. SIMON64/128: 22-round distinguishers
In this section we combine several truncated diﬀerential properties in order
to construct a 22-round distinguisher. In particular, we combine two transitions
discovered to propagate with suﬃciently high probability for 10 and 2 rounds.
The transitions are presented in Result A.
Following precisely this methodology we end up in the problem of distinguish-
ing the following two Gaussian distributions.
• Natural Propagation: X: N (212, 26).
• SIMON: Y: N (212 + 27,√(212 + 27)).
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 
[0000002200000080]
↓ (10R)
[002EFF9A00022E4C]
↓ (10R)
[0000002200000800]
↓ (2R)
[0A50002209010008]
is a 22 rounds distinguisher with 2 standard deviations for this variant
of SIMON.
 We have in total 263 · 23 = 266 pairs of plaintexts (P, P ′) that
satisfy P ⊕ P ′ ∈ [0000002200000080]. A proportion 210/264 is expected to have
a ciphertext diﬀerence
C ⊕ C′ ∈ [0A50002209010008]
by accident (random permutation) after either a large number of rounds or
by simply at random, which implies 212 pairs. Now in case of SIMON we ex-
pect 266−17·0−38·0−4·0 = 27 to follow this truncated diﬀerential path with the
speciﬁed diﬀerences in the middle. Since these distributions converge to Gauss
distributions, but the underlying source for observed samples is approximated
by P o i s s o n, we can assume that the standard deviation can be computed
by the square root of the mean.
The other problem that we need to consider is the problem of the number
of pairs that by accident have also this intermediate diﬀerences after 10 and 20
rounds as speciﬁed by the distinguisher. For this particular example, we have that
216 · 2−17−38 ≈ 2−39
are expected to have these intermediate diﬀerences. We need to stress that we
are NOT looking at a random permutation, but at a real SIMON with 22 rounds
and at events which occur at random on the outside (input and output), whether
they can propagate on the inside as predicted (which would mean that random
events interfere with non-random events). This is expected to be zero events
in common in most cases, sometimes 1 and 2−39 on average, and thus the two
sets of events are completely disjoint in practice.
Note that we follow the following hypothesis testing; if the number of pairs
observed during the attack exceeds 212+27, then we accept the key assumption
as correct, otherwise we reject it. This implies that the Type II error of our
attack is automatically set to half. That implies that we have to repeat twice
our attack in order to retrieve the correct key.
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3.3. Application B: GOST
GOST is a block cipher with a simple 32-round Feistel structure which en-
crypts a 64-bit block using a 256-bit key [1, 3]. Each round of GOST contains
a key addition modulo 232, a set of 8 bijective S-boxes on 4 bits and a simple
rotation by 11 positions to the left. The image of any 64-bit block of the form
L||R (where L and R the left and the right half, respectively) after 1 round
of GOST is given by
(L,R) → (R,L⊕ Fi(R)), (12)
where Fi is the internal function used in each round. GOST has a very simple
key schedule. The 256-bit key is divided into eight 32-bit words k0, k1, . . . , k7,
where the ﬁrst 24 rounds use the keys in this order and only the last 8 rounds
use them in the reverse order, as shown in Table 1, on the page 228.
Table 1. Key schedule in GOST.
R1–R8 R9–R16
k0, k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6, k7 k0, k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6, k7
R17–R24 R25–R32
k0, k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6, k7 k7, k6, k5, k4, k3, k2, k1, k0
3.4. GOST: 20-round distinguisher
In this section we present the results obtained when our methodology is
applied to the GOST which uses the standard set of S-boxes.
 
[8078000000000700]
↓ (7R)
[8070070080700700]
↓ (6R)
[8070070080700700]
↓ (7R)
[0000070080780000]
is a 20-round distinguisher with approx. 69 standard deviations for this variant
of GOST.
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We have (28−1)(28−1) possibilities of type: [8078000000000700)]→ (after some
permutation OR 20 inner rounds of GOST) → [0000070080780000]. For a typical
permutation2 on 64-bits we expect that there are 0.5 · 28+8 = 215 pairs (Pi, Pj)
with such diﬀerences. The distribution of this number can be approximated by a
Gaussian with a standard deviation 27.5.
Following [12] or Fact 3.4.1 in page 13 of [10] and given 264+14−1 pairs with
the initial diﬀerence, we have 277−18.7 = 258.3 pairs for the middle 6 rounds.
Then following Fact 3.4.2 in page 13 of [10] the propagation in the next 7
rounds occurs with probability 2−22.2 on average over GOST keys. Since this is a
permutation, the same propagation can be applied backwards in the preceding 7
rounds. Overall, we expect that 258.3−44.4 = 213.9 pairs survive.
Now we show that with large probability none of these 213.9 pairs Pi, Pj
is a member of the set of 215 established beforehand. For any of the 215
cases which occur naturally at random, we have a non-zero input diﬀeren-
tial [8078000000000700]. Then, a computer simulation shows that a diﬀerential
of type [807007008070070] CAN occurs at 7 rounds later but only with proba-
bility of 2−16.2. Similarly, it can also occur 7 rounds from the end, but only with
probability of 2−16.2. Overall we expect that only about 215−16.2−16.2 = 2−17
pairs Pi, Pj on average will have the “propagation” characteristics as shown
above. Therefore, the two sets are entirely disjoint with a very high probability.
As in Result A the standard deviation is expected to be equal exactly to
the square root of their expected average number of 215 + 213.9, which will be
about 27.8. The 213.9 additional events divided by 27.8 means that we get a
distinguisher which works at 26.1 ≈ 69 standard deviations.
We refer to [9], [10] to show how to transform this distinguisher into a complex
multiple stage attack on full 32 round GOST with running time of 2179.
4. Conclusion
The main task in symmetric cryptanalysis is to use structure of the block
cipher in order to construct distinguishers which can be used to distinguish a
large number of rounds from a random permutation. In this paper, we described
a hypothesis-testing framework for constructing such distinguishers, using trun-
cated diﬀerential properties inside the cipher. We apply this methodology to two
well-known ciphers, GOST and SIMON, to construct a 20-round and a 22-round
2It does not have to be a random permutation, it can be GOST with more rounds are any
other permutation somewhat artiﬁcially constructed by an attacker when his assumptions are
incorrect.
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distinguishers respectively. In our additional works which are published sepa-
rately we have successfully built various distinguishers of similar kind for GOST
and SIMON and demonstrate how to transform such distinguishers to develop
key recovery attacks against (up to) the full round ciphers [5], [7]– [10], [14].
Our best truncated diﬀerential result on GOST leads to an attack in 2179 which
is described in full in [9], [10]. In [5], [6], [10], [14] and in the present paper
we explain in detail how such attacks can be constructed with a mix of insights,
heuristics and a careful analysis of numerous possible variants.
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